We propose an approach on model checking information flow for imperative language with procedures. We characterize our model with pushdown system, which has a stack of unbounded length that naturally models the execution of procedural programs. Because the type-based static analysis is sometimes too conservative and rejects safe program as illtyped, we take a semantic-based approach by self-composing symbolic pushdown system and specifying noninterference with LTL formula. Then we verify this LTL-expressed property via model checker Moped. Except for overcoming the conservative characteristic of type-based approach, our motivation also includes the insufficient state of arts on precise information flow analysis under interprocedural setting. To remedy the inefficiency of model checking compared with type system, we propose both compact form and contracted form of self-composition. According to experimental results, they can greatly increase the efficiency of realistic verification. Our method provides flexibility on separating program abstraction from noninterference verification, thus could be expected to use on different programming languages.
Introduction
Noninterference is a standard criterion to formalize secure information flow. This property was first introduced by Goguen and Meseguer [1] for multi-level computing system and applied to programming language via semantic model. It commonly means any two runs of program starting in two indistinguishable states yield two indistinguishable final states. That is to say, for any pair of runs the difference on secret input are unobservable via public output.
Typical information flow analyses are studied using security type system [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] . These type systems guarantee well-typed programs do not leak any secret information. But these type-based approaches are considered conservative and sometimes reject safe programs, such as l := h · 0. Take the following program as another example, Suppose l and x are low, while h and y are high, standard type system [2] rejects this program over-restrictively by reporting a flow from h to x.
To remedy this problem, semantic-based approaches [7] [8] are developed, especially a recent popular approach, selfcomposition [9] [10] , which composes the original program with a variable-renamed copy to avoid considering correlative executions as pair. Model checking is an important method to verify properties of semantic-based program model. It is well-known as fully-automated and mature tool-supported. Though argued against the high complexity, model checking has been used to check noninterference, combined with abstract interpretation [11] , selfcomposition [10] [12] , and type-based approach [12] .
Lots of existing work get into the spectrum of discussing noninterference over more complex program constructs. Procedure is considered as a common feature of realistic imperative languages. In some applications we need to verify code from different sources together. Also there may be context-sensitive procedure calls in program. Noninterference verification of these programs involves interprocedural information flow. Consider the program below i n t h , l ;
. . . f u n c ( h , l ) ; . . . void f u n c ( i n t a , i n t &b ) { i n t c : = 0 ; w h i l e ( a >0) { c ++; a−−; } b := c ; } after func returns, the high variable h has indirectly passed to the low variable l. Suppose the global variables are only observable after func returns, interprocedural analysis is required. Volpano and Smith [3] has developed a nonstandard type system to check information flow of an imperative language with procedures. But for the more precise approaches [12] [10] [11] , procedure is not considered.
Beringer et al. [13] adapt type-based approach to Hoarelike logic and introduce an auxiliary binary formulae to encode noninterference according to the principle of selfcomposition. Their procedure model is restricted to parameterless form. Hammer et al. [14] investigate an approach for information flow control based on a program slicing technique, program dependence graph. Inter-procedural information flow control can be achieved by computing summary graph and constructing system dependence graph. They introduce path condition [15] to improve the preciseness. This method is also more expensive than type-based approaches and indicates conservativeness if some PC(y,x)≡true.
The relative insufficient study on interprocedural information flow in state of arts motivates us to propose a general interprocedural framework for more precise information flow analyses than the type-based approaches. Our model is based on symbolic pushdown system [16] . Pushdown system is a transition system with a stack of unbounded length, which provides a natural way to model the execution of program with procedure. The state of pushdown system includes control locations and stack symbols. Control locations are used to store global variables. Stack symbols contain both control points and local variables of procedure. This semantic model has been proved sound to our language and can be directly expressed as the input of model checker Moped [17] .
The verification process consists of the following phases. First a symbolic pushdown system is derived from corelanguage program. Then we self-compose the derived symbolic pushdown system and express noninterference with LTL formula as the inputs of Moped. Verification is then performed by Moped. If noninterference is violated by the program model, we can get a single counterexample. This witness trace can help us find out which high variable causes the insecure information flow, thus be useful for secure program development. We have experimentally proved that our method is more precise than ordinary type-based analysis on interprocedural information flow. Considering the relative high complexity of model checking, we have developed two derived forms of ordinary self-composition, called compact self-composition and contracted self-composition. The experiments indicate great efficiency improvement with these derived forms. Another advantage of our approach is the flexibility unveiled by self-composing symbolic pushdown system instead of high-level language. Unlike other work did self-composition directly on high-level languages [12] [10], our approach separates the possible abstractions of highlevel languages from noninterference verification. Although we use a simple imperative language with procedure for simplicity, we believe it possible to apply our approach to different high-level programming languages by abstracting them into pushdown systems.
The rest of our paper is structured as follows. Section 2 sketches the simple imperative language and presents symbolic pushdown system derivation. Section 3 proposes the algorithms of different forms of self-composition for composing pushdown system, and noninterference specifications with LTL. In Section 4 we report our experiments.
Program Modeling

Language Syntax and Semantics
The syntax of our core language with first-order procedure is given in Figure 1 . l is memory location. The in param-v : := c | true | false (value) e : := x | v | l | e 1 • e 2 | proc(in x 1 , out x 2 )S (expression) S : := skip | e := e | if e then S 1 else S 2 | while e do S | S 1 ; S 2 | letvar x := e in S | e(e 1 , e 2 ) (statement) Figure 1 . Language Syntax eter is local while the out parameter represents reference to global variable. The big-step operational semantics are presented in Figure 2 . μ, λ ⊆ L × V are heap and stack respectively, where L is the domain of memory location and V is the domain of value. dom(μ)∩dom(λ) = ∅. λ [l :
= v] extends λ with a new l assigned with v. BINDVAR stores v to new location l of λ and refers each free occurrence of x in S to l. Therefore the scope of x is S, and l is deallocated after the execution of S. We assume all substitutions captureavoiding and procedure main non-recursive.
Pushdown System
Definition 2.1 (Pushdown System). A pushdown system is a triple P = (P, Γ, Δ). P is a finite set of control location, Γ is stack alphabet, and Δ ⊆ (P × Γ) × (P × Γ * ) is a finite set of pushdown rules. The pushdown rule has a form of
w stands for a snapshot of stack content. Suppose the configuration set of P is denoted by Conf(P). We have a transition relation ⊆ Conf(P) × Conf(P) defined by the set of pushdown rules Δ as follows: If p, γ → p , w , then p, γw p , ww for all w ∈ Γ * . Let c 0 be the initial configuration. We have a transition system corresponding to the pushdown system as I P = (Conf(P), , c 0 ).
Each pushdown rule gives a pattern of program execution step. Without loss of generality, we assume | w |≤ 2 in that any pushdown system can be put into a normal form(| w |≤ 2) with linear size increase [16] .
. P 0 is the set of symbolic control locations, and Γ 0 is stack alphabet. G and L are respectively the domain of the control locations and stack symbols. The pushdown rules have a form (p, g)(γ, l) → (p , g ), (γ 1 , l 1 ), . . . , (γ n , l n ) , where p, p ∈ P 0 , γ, γ 1 , . . . , γ n ∈ Γ 0 . The corresponding symbolic form separates the symbolic part from a relation of valu-
Here we can also generally suppose n 2. Δ is the set of symbolic pushdown rules.
The global variables are encoded into control locations and the local variables are encoded into the stack symbols.
Figure 2. Induction Rules
Since we specify the control points of each procedure with stack symbols, and the global and local variables are considered as their value in R, P 0 × G can be simplified to G and the symbolic pushdown rule is of form γ → γ 1 , . . . , γ n , (g, l, g , l 1 , . . . , l n ) ∈ R.
Pushdown Rules Derivation
Suppose local variable x of procedure p is uniquely denoted by p, x ∈ P × Q, where P is the domain of procedure tag and Q is the domain of local variable name. Figure 3 gives static analysis F to get the unified local variable set θ ⊆ P × Q. Partial function η : P → 2 Q , η(p) = {x | p, x ∈ θ}, derives all local variables of a procedure. Let N = {n i | i ∈ N} be a pool of control points from which we get unique control point during pushdown rule derivation. In order to derive pushdown rules for program, we define Φ(S, n i , n j , p, R) in Figure 5 . n i and n j are respectively the entry and exit control point of S. ρ = dom(μ). R is a set collecting information about variable variation and variable evaluation in statement transition for each pushdown rule. We extend R in P-BRANCH and P-LOOP to record the precondition of control flow. R is initialized with ∅. ε denotes the empty stack symbol.
, p is the tag of proc In order to translate the derived pushdown rules into symbolic form, we suppose the control point as explicit stack symbol. We prime left-side variables of evaluation relations in R. Then we prime the post-transition global variables and local variables in top stack symbol, also double-prime the post-transition local variables in bottom stack symbol. For the variable holding its value during transition, extend R with an equivalence relation of that variable. Then we derive the symbolic form { n s → (n t1 ) . . . (n t k ) | R}, (k = 0, 1, 2). Figure 4 gives the symbolic pushdown rules of the example calling procedure func in Section 1.
The derived symbolic pushdown system is sound on enforcing noninterference for the core language programs as shown in the following theorem. Let μ = ρ, θ be the state of P. P μ means an execution of P with initial state μ. It returns a final state μ or ⊥ if it does not terminate. Theorem 2.3 (Soundness). Suppose P = (P, Γ, Δ) is the pushdown system of statement S. Δ is derived by Φ(S, n i , n j , p k , ∅). ∀ρ 0 , θ 0 , μ 0 , λ 0 , P ( ρ 0 , θ 0 ) = ρ , θ , (μ 0 , λ 0 , S) ↓ (μ , λ ). We have procedure p k on the top of procedure stack of λ 0 and λ . Suppose ∀l ∈ dom(μ), μ 0 (l) = ρ 0 [l], and ∀l ∈ dom(λ 0 ) corresponds to variable
Proof. Detailed proof is stated in our technical report [18] .
Noninterference Property Specification
Suppose the adversary can observe whether program terminates, noninterference can be classified into terminationsensitive(TS) and termination-insensitive(TI). , if x ∈ η(p) Φ(S1; S2, ni, nj, p, R) = Φ(S1, ni, n k , p, R) ∪ Φ(S2, n k , nj, p, R) (P-SEQ) Φ(if e then S1 else S2, ni, nj, p, R) = { (ρi)(ni, ηi(p)) → (ρi)(n k , ηi ( 
Definition 3.2 (TI). A pushdown system P has a property of TI if it satisfies ∀μ 1 ,
TI can be simplified by restricting the precondition:
For simplicity, we only consider TI in the following. The LTL w.r.t TS can be derived similarly by method in [9] .
Ordinary Self-Composition
The primary motivation of self-composition is to model two correlative runs of program with indistinguishable inputs as a single run of composed program, which greatly benefits the algorithmic verification techniques, such as model checking, on the property expressing via temporal logics.
Suppose P 1 and P 2 are pushdown systems. μ 1 , μ 1 are states of P 1 , and μ 2 , μ 2 are states of P 2 . Let μ 1 ∩ μ 2 = (ρ 1 ∩ ρ 2 ) ∪ (θ 1 ∩ θ 2 ). ⊕ is disjoint union of memory. If μ 1 ∩ μ 2 = ∅, we define disjoint composition operation of P 1 and P 2 as
Suppose μ = ρ, θ be a state of P. The state of P[ξ] is derived by renaming the variables of P by function ξ : μ → {x * | x ∈ ρ}, { p, y * | p, y ∈ θ} , such that ∀x ∈ ρ, ξ(x) = x * and ∀ p, y ∈ θ, ξ( p, y ) = p, y * . The ordinary self-composition is defined based on disjoint composition and variable renaming, and the corresponding TI is defined as: 
Compact Self-Composition
Since our approach is based on symbolic model checking, the variable count has great impact on the size of binary decision diagram (BDD) and performance of model checker. The increase in variable count after ordinary selfcomposition seriously decreases the efficiency of model checking. This motivates us to find new self-composing methods in interprocedural settings. The compact form of self-composition relies on the following two assumptions -All the variables observable by the adversary are global.
That means to treat the procedure with observation point in it as main procedure. -All local variables are initialized before being used in procedure, and vanish while procedure returns, thus are considered as high. 
Suppose ⊕ ρ is the disjoint union of global variables, we have compact disjoint composition ρ of P 1 and P 2 , where P 1 (μ 1 ⊕ l μ) = (μ 1 ⊕ μ) for some μ, and P 2 (μ ⊕ r μ 2 ) = (μ ⊕ μ 2 ) for some μ , iff 
The self-composing algorithm w.r.t compact form is derived by modifying step 3 to step 5 of the algorithm in Section 3.1 to the following strategies 3 . For each rule of P, ∀x * ∈ ρ 2 , add x * = x * to R. 4 . For each rule of P[ξ], ∀x ∈ ρ 1 , add x = x to R.
Contracted Self-Composition
According to the assumptions given in Section 3.2, we know that noninterference property at certain observation point of program does not really care the value of local variables in the callee procedures. By the algorithm of Section 3.2, we have reduced the length of R accompanying pushdown rules. Since the adversary can only observe global variables of main procedure, we can avoid duplicating memory of local variables by making the composed part of main procedure call the original callee, instead of the composed callee. This form of self-composition additionally relies on the following assumption: -Global variable can not be used in callee procedure unless it is passed as parameter of callee procedure. With the contracted form of self-composition, we do not compose callee procedures. Therefore we could not express the direct effect of newly defined global variables on local variables of callee procedures. The state of memory of P[ξ ] is derived by ξ : ρ, θ → {x * | x ∈ ρ}, θ such that ∀x ∈ ρ, ξ (x) = x * and ∀ p, y ∈ θ, ξ ( p, y ) = p, y . We have TI w.r.t a contracted form.
Definition 3.6 (TI,contracted self-composition). P has a property of TI iff
The related self-composing algorithm distinguishes pushdown rules of main from pushdown rules of callees. 1. Derive P[ξ ] by substituting variables of P with renamed variables defined by ξ . For pushdown rules of main procedure, substitute each n i → n j with n * i → n * j , n i → ε with n * i → ε , and n i → n k , n j with n * i → n k , n * j . Merge P[ξ ] and P, taking duplicated pushdown rules only once. 2. Same as step 2 in Section 3.1. 3. Same as step 3 and 4 in Section 3.2. The corresponding LTL-expressed TI for compact selfcomposition and contracted self-composition is (ρ 1 = L ρ 2 ) ⇒ G(n * f inal ⇒ (ρ 1 = L ρ 2 )).
Experiments
The main purpose of our experiments is to reveal that the derived forms of self-composition, compared with the ordinary form, can really improve the efficiency of verification. Also we make clear how we could benefit from the procedural settings and model checking.
We have implemented all three forms of self-composition for symbolic pushdown system. All experiments were performed on a laptop with 1.66 GHz Intel Core 2 CPU and 1 GB RAM running Linux Fedora Core 6. The BDD library used by Moped is CUDD 2.3.1. Experimental results are Table 1 . #gvars and #lvars give the number of global variables and the number of local variables respectively. #pubs represents the number of public/low variables. N gives the number of bit of each integer variable. As shown in Figure 6 , larger N causes increase in consumed time and memory. Fortunately however, the secure/insecure judgement made by our method is mostly insensitive to N , thus we could set N as small as possible to outperform other methods. The only matter is to ensure the range of integer (0 ∼ 2 N − 1) cover the constant value assigned to it. The basic checking result Yes reports the program is secure, while the answer No, along with the witness path generated as a counterexample, not only tells the program is insecure, but facilitates our method on reasoning the flow path from certain high variable to low variables. In another word, the single counterexample identified by model checker could tell us the flow-source variable with security level high.
Program ttaa1, ttaa2 and ttaa3 are respectively programs presented in Figure 1 , Figure 4 and Figure 9 of [10] . In [10] the authors report a failure on verifying ttaa3 secure using BLAST. Here using our method we can verify this program secure. hu1 and hu2 model the program expr1.c and expr2.c of [12] . In order to explain the benefit from procedural setting, we encapsulate the ifbranch of hu2 into a procedure and change hu2 to a program calling this procedure for sixteen times. The resulting program is hu2_func. The evaluation results are illustrated by Figure 6 . Compared with ordinary self-composition of hu2, consumed time and memory are greatly reduced by the ordinary self-composition of hu2_func. To make clear the effectiveness of the derived forms of self-composition, we did ordinary and compact self-composition on hu2 (since no procedure exists, the contracted form is not available) and all three forms of self-composition on hu2_func. The time reduction by using compact form is more notable on hu2 than on hu2_func. This is because hu2 has more local variables, and the conjunction of relations in R is much shorter for compact form than ordinary form. That means each symbolic pushdown rule of derived pushdown system corresponds to more explicit pushdown rules and smaller BDD. The only one local variable of hu2_func could not make this effect obvious. The contracted form outperforms the compact form because the number of derived local variables is reduced to half compared with compact form and the number of pushdown rules is also reduced.
To show the realistic usage of our method, we have verified the standard module mod_imap.c of Apache 1.3.23. This program is also verified in [12] . In the imap_url function of this program, a possible tainted Referer url could be returned and passed to menu_ * functions and then to the arguments of ap_rvputs. ap_rvputs passes these arguments to client browser and causes a cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability. To check XSS, we consider the parameters of ap_rvputs as variables with high integrity, while the returned HTTP REFERER has low integrity. The dual verification problem on integrity means to decide the high variables hold the following relation (μ 1 = H μ 2 ) ⇒ G(n * f inal ⇒ (μ 1 = H μ 2 )). Since Moped can only deal with integer and boolean variables and array of both types, we have to first abstract string to integer, and model the string operations with binary operations of integers. To ensure that the abstract integer variable could be assigned by constant value modeling constant string, N could not be less than 4. We have successfully verified this program insecure. The experimental results indicate the efficiency of our method under proper abstraction is competitive to other methods [12] .
